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Abstract Insurance claims fraud is counted among the major concerns in the insur-
ance industry, the reason being that excess payments due to fraudulent claims ac-
count for a large percentage of the total payments each year. We formulate optimiza-
tion problems from the insurance company as well as the policyholder perspective
based on a costly state verification approach. In this setting—while the policyholder
observes his losses privately—the insurance company can decide to verify the truth-
fulness of incoming claims at some cost. We show simulation results illustrating the
agreement range which is characterized by all valid fraud and auditing probability
combinations both stakeholders are willing to accept. Furthermore, we present the
impact of different valid probability combinations on the insurance company’s and
the policyholder’s objective quantities and analyze the sensitivity of the agreement
range with respect to a relevant input parameter. This contribution summarizes the
major findings of a working paper written by Müller et al. (Working Papers on Risk
Management and Insurance (IVW-HSG), No. 92, 2011).
Zusammenfassung Die Bekämpfung von Versicherungsbetrug gehört zu den zen-
tralen Herausforderungen in der Versicherungswirtschaft. Für den Versicherungsneh-
mer besteht regelmässig die Möglichkeit einer Falschangabe bezüglich der tatsächli-
chen Schadenhöhe. Das Versicherungsunternehmen behält sich vor, den Wahrheits-
gehalt eingehender Forderungen zu überprüfen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden zu-
lässige Betrugs- sowie Prüfwahrscheinlichkeiten aus der Sicht beider Vertragspart-
ner hergeleitet und in Form eines Einigungsbereichs (in einem solchen sind Versi-
cherungsnehmer und -unternehmen bereit, einen Vertrag abzuschliessen) illustriert.
This contribution summarizes the major findings of a working paper written by Müller et al. (2011)
which was presented by Katja Müller at the annual meeting of “Deutscher Verein
für Versicherungswissenschaft e.V.” in Hannover, March 2012.
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Auf dieser Grundlage wird im Anschluss das jeweilige optimale Verhalten ermittelt.
Zusätzlich wird der Einfluss relevanter Parameter auf Form und Ausmass des Eini-
gungsbereiches analysiert. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt eine Zusammenfassung der
zentralen Erkenntnisse aus einem Arbeitspapier von Müller et al. (Working Papers on
Risk Management and Insurance (IVW-HSG), No. 92, 2011) dar.
1 Introduction
Insurance claims fraud arose to be one of the major concerns among the insurance
industry. It occurs in all classes of insurance and accounts for a significant portion of
the indemnity payments each year. The Insurance Research Council (IRC) published
the study “Fraud and Buildup in Auto Injury Insurance Claims: 2008 Edition” in
20081 according to which the excess payments due to fraudulent claims added up to
an estimated total of $4.8 to $6.8 billion in the auto injury insurance sector in the
U.S. during the year 2007. Conferred to the five main private passenger auto injury
coverages this corresponds to 13 to 18 percent of the total payments.
The phenomenon of insurance claims fraud is based on information being asym-
metrically distributed between policyholder and the corresponding insurance com-
pany (see, e.g., Derrig 2002). Since insureds may hold private information about the
actual amount of the loss suffered, there exists the possibility of misrepresentation.
Consequently, the insurance companies can choose to audit incoming claims in order
to determine their truthfulness. In case of detected fraudulent behavior, a penalty pay-
ment can be imposed on the policyholder. However, this verification process comes at
some cost. Therefore, the costs for auditing have to be traded off against the savings
resulting from detected fraud.
The goal of this contribution is to derive and analyze optimal auditing and fraud
probabilities from both the insurance company and policyholder perspective respec-
tively aiming to maintain a common agreement range. For this purpose, we introduce
a model framework based on a costly state verification environment which considers
the insurance company’s net present value of future cash flows as well as the pol-
icyholder’s expected utility of his terminal wealth position. In order to make sure
that both stakeholders are willing to sign and remain in the insurance contract, we
include participation constraints. At first, some analytical solutions to the formulated
optimization problems are derived and interpreted. However, due to the complexity
of the model it is not always possible to derive closed-form solutions. Therefore, we
present a numerical approach using Monte Carlo methods. The simulation results
and their implications for both stakeholders’ optimal strategies are discussed and il-
lustrated graphically.
The agreement range which we derive determines the optimal behavior of the in-
surance company and the policyholder to that effect that the respective other is still
willing to participate in the insurance contract. Consequently, it consists of all valid
fraud and auditing probability combinations both stakeholders are willing to accept.
For which part of the agreement range the participants settle depends on their market
1See Insurance Research Council (2008).
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power. Assuming a highly competitive market, it is likely for those fraud and au-
diting probability combinations to be performed which maximize the policyholder’s
objective while the insurance company is still willing to participate in the insurance
contract. In case of an monopoly, other probability combinations are of interest since
the insurance company will try to maximize its own objective quantity while making
sure that potential policyholders accept an insurance contract.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We start by giving an
overview of the related literature in Sect. 2. Thereafter, we present the model frame-
work and first analytical results in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, the numerical approach and the
corresponding program are introduced. We discuss the simulation results in Sect. 5
before concluding in Sect. 6.
2 Literature overview
A comprehensive discussion of the related literature can be found in Müller et al.
(2011). In the following, we summarize the main references.
One of the first to present the costly state verification approach was Townsend
(1979). In his paper, he discusses optimal insurance contracts between two agents
holding different information on actual events which can be transfered at some cost.
His analysis is based on deterministic auditing policies which are characterized by
verifying incoming claims with a probability of either one or zero. Picard (2000)
extends this approach and examines the impact of principal-agent relationships on
the design of optimal insurance contracts when having exogenous agents perform
the auditing. Furthermore, the possibility of policyholders being able to manipulate
auditing costs is included. Carlier and Dana (2003) study the existence and charac-
teristics of efficient contracts when introducing a fixed component in the costs per
audit and hence observing non-convex auditing costs. Mookherjee and Png (1989)
prove that under certain conditions random auditing is always the optimal strategy.
Picard and Fagart (1999) pick up this idea and analyze questions regarding the form
of the auditing probability function as well as the optimal coverage schedule when
assuming different kinds of risk aversion. Furthermore, Picard (1996) adds the aspect
of insurance companies not being able to commit to their audit strategy. He shows
that this issue can be eliminated by introducing a third party to perform the auditing.
Boyer (2000) however found that there are conditions under which centralizing the
investigation and verification process with the help of insurance fraud bureaus would
lead to an even higher amount of fraud.
Another way to approach the topic of insurance claims fraud is by applying costly
state falsification models. In this case, the policyholder can manipulate at some cost
the amount of the claimed loss in order to obtain higher indemnity payments. Crocker
and Tennyson (2002) show that under these conditions claims auditing does not serve
as a deterrent. This leads to the introduction of an optimal indemnification profile
which consists of systematically underpaying claims. However, Hau (2008) argues
that separating costly state verification and costly state falsification models does not
map the reality. He proves that based on the assumption of imperfect auditing pro-
cesses, i.e., fraudulent behavior is detected with a probability less than one in case of
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auditing, an optimal insurance contract consists of both falsification and verification.
Similarly, Bond and Crocker (1997) have already found that the combination of over-
paying claims which can be easily verified and underpaying claims which require
a more costly auditing process can be used to effectively combat insurance claims
fraud.
3 Model framework
In this section, we present the model framework which is applied in Müller et al.
(2011).
An individual with initial wealth W0 is offered the possibility to sign an insurance
contract with a fixed premium P due by the time of inception of insurance cover in
t = t0. At the same time, he faces some uncertain loss θ of stochastic amount which,
by the time of occurrence, is observed privately. In case he signed the insurance con-
tract earlier, the policyholder can then chose to file a claim of some size θˆ . In case of
honest behavior the amount of that claim will equal the actual loss, i.e., θˆ = θ . If the
policyholder decides to commit fraud, he reports some finite θˆ > θ . The probability
of the policyholder choosing to report a fraudulent claim is denoted by p.
The insurer on the other hand has no information about the actual occurred loss.
He therefore audits incoming claims with some probability q and at the constant cost
of k per audited claim. Depending on whether auditing took place or not and the
outcome in case of an audit, a payment R is made from the insurance company to the
policyholder.
Considering the different possible combinations of fraud and auditing probabilities
p and q , the payment R can be defined as follows:
R(θ, θˆ) = (1 − p) θ + p [(1 − q) θˆ + q (θ − B)], (1)
with B being the penalty payment deducted from the claim amount θ .
Equation (1) can be interpreted as an indemnity payment if R is positive, whereas
a negative R represents the penalty payment made from the insured to the insurance
company in case of detected fraud when B > θ . There are several possible cases to
be considered: If the reported loss is not checked, the insured receives the payment of
θˆ . In case of auditing, the payment depends on whether the policyholder committed
fraud or not. Proven honesty leads to a payment of θ = θˆ . If a misrepresentation of
loss is determined, the policyholder faces some penalty B . In practice, B is mostly
chosen such that θ − B = 0.
In this framework setting, we take audits to be perfect, i.e., if a fraudulent claim is
made it will surely be detected in case of auditing.
3.1 Insurance company: cash flow, net present value and participation constraint
In the framework introduced above, we observe the future cash flows from the insur-
ance company perspective at the time of insurance inception in t = t0 and the time of
loss realization and settling in t = t1 and analyze their resulting net present value.
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In case of an insurance contract coming into existence, the insurance company
receives the premium payment P in t = t0. An incoming claim in t = t1 which is
audited with probability q and at some given cost k(> 0) per analyzed claim, results
in −R(θ, θˆ) − qk.
The insurance company’s net present value of its future incoming and outgoing
cash flows is denoted by2
NPV = P − E(R(θ, θˆ)) − qk, (2)
where R(θ, θˆ) denotes the indemnity payment as defined in (1).
Condition 1 The insurance company is willing to participate in an insurance con-
tract if its net present value is positive. Hence, one obtains the following participation
constraint:
NPV ≥ 0. (3)
Applying (2), participation constraint (3) can be formulated as
P ≥ E(R(θ, θˆ)) + qk. (4)
Apparently, the expression on the right-hand side represents a lower bound for the
premium payments the insurance company is willing to accept. Its value depends
on the expected value of the indemnity payments which will be made and a loading
which reflects the auditing effort.
3.2 Policyholder: wealth position, utility function and participation constraint
From the policyholder perspective, we analyze his wealth position and the corre-
sponding expected utility at the time of inception of insurance cover t = t0 and the
time of loss realization and claiming t = t1 for the framework introduced above.
An individual initially owns some wealth W0. Its consecutive development de-
pends on whether he signs an insurance contract prior to the occurrence of loss or
not. In a situation without insurance contract, the individual holds the unchanged
wealth position
WB0 = W0 (5)
at time t = t0. At the time of loss occurrence in t = t1, this amount decreases to
WB1 = WB0 − θ = W0 − θ. (6)
The decision to sign an insurance contract is accompanied by the payment of an
insurance premium P . Consequently, when signing the contract at time t = t0 the
individual owns the wealth position
WA0 = W0 − P. (7)
2We consider the expected value of future cash flows discounted with the risk-free interest rate rf = 0.
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Assuming a loss θ of some stochastic level occurs and therefore a claim is filed at
time t = t1 , the policyholder’s wealth at that point in time is denoted by
WA1 = WA0 − θ + R(θ, θˆ) = W0 − P − θ + R(θ, θˆ) (8)
with R(θ, θˆ) as defined in (1).
We assume the policyholder’s utility being described by a standard mean-variance
utility function of his individual wealth. For a given wealth position W and the risk
aversion parameter a(> 0) of the individual, this utility function is given by
U(W) = E(W) − a
2
Var(W), (9)
where E(W) denotes the expected value of the stochastic variable W .
In case no insurance contract was signed prior to the occurrence of loss, using (6)
and definition (9) the final utility is written as:
U
(
WB1
) = E(W0 − θ) − a2 Var(W0 − θ)
= W0 − E(θ) − a2 Var(θ). (10)
For the setting in which an insurance contract was signed by applying the defini-
tion in (9) to (8), we obtain:
U
(
WA1
) = E(W0 − P − θ + R(θ, θˆ)
) − a
2
Var
(
W0 − P − θ + R(θ, θˆ)
)
= W0 − P − E
(
θ − R(θ, θˆ)) − a
2
Var
(
θ − R(θ, θˆ)). (11)
Comparing (10) and (11), one sees the difference in influencing factors for the
final expected utility for each situation: In a setting without the existence of an in-
surance contract the final expected utility U(WB1 ) solely depends on the extend of
the actual loss θ and the policyholder’s risk aversion parameter a. However, in a sit-
uation in which insurance coverage exists, the value of the corresponding expected
utility U(WA1 ) is not only influenced by θ , P and a. In fact, the policyholder’s fraud
strategy p and the insurer’s auditing strategy q have an impact on that value due to
the payment of R (see (1)). Moreover, if the insured decides to commit fraud, the size
of θˆ which he choses to claim is relevant as well as the enforced penalty payment B
(see (1)) in case the fraudulent claim gets detected.
Condition 2 The individual’s decision to get insurance coverage in the first place
depends on whether his utility by the time of loss occurrence is greater with having
insurance than without it, i.e.,
U
(
WA1
) ≥ U(WB1
)
. (12)
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Using (11) and (10) this participation constraint (12) can be written as
−P + E(R(θ, θˆ)) − a
2
Var
(
θ − R(θ, θˆ)) ≥ −a
2
Var(θ)
⇐⇒ P − E(R(θ, θˆ)) ≤ −a
2
Var
(
R(θ, θˆ)
) + a Cov(θ,R(θ, θˆ)). (13)
Based on the representation P ≤ E(R(θ, θˆ))− a2 Var(R(θ, θˆ ))+a Cov(θ,R(θ, θˆ)),
the inequality in (13) can be interpreted as an upper bound for the insurance premium
the potential policyholder is willing to pay for his insurance coverage. It depends on
the utility of the payment R and the covariance between actual loss θ and R. Further-
more, the individual’s risk aversion parameter a has an influence on his willingness
to pay.
3.3 Optimization of positions
So far, the model framework as well as the participation constraints for both the poli-
cyholder and the insurance company have been presented. Based on this information,
we state the corresponding optimization problems.
The insurance company is aiming to maximize the net present value of the in-
coming and outgoing future payments with respect to its audit strategy such that both
stakeholders are still willing to participate, i.e., (12) and (3) hold. Again, it is assumed
that the other parameters are given. This objective function can be written as
Insurance company’s optimization problem:
Find the optimal audit strategy q s.t. NPV is maximized
and (12), (3) hold.
(14)
At the same time, the policyholder’s aim is to maximize his final expected utility
with respect to his fraud strategy such that both participation constraints (12) and (3)
hold, i.e., an insurance contract exists. It is assumed that all the other parameters are
given. We will denote this optimization problem by the following
Policyholder’s optimization problem:
Find the optimal fraud behavior p s.t. U
(
WA1
)
is maximized
and (12), (3) hold.
(15)
Both stakeholders try to optimize their own position respectively. Our aim is to
analyze these conflicting objectives and participation constraints from both insured’s
and insurer’s perspective and find a common agreement range for the resulting fraud
and auditing strategies.
3.4 Assumptions about the distribution of information
Before presenting the results of our analytical analyses, we summarize the assump-
tions regarding the distribution of information among the stakeholders.
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3.4.1 Insurance company perspective
The insurance company is assumed to have full information about the distribution
of the reported losses θˆ due to having observed incoming claims in the past. Fur-
thermore, we expect that it has an adequate estimate for the distribution of the ac-
tual losses θ based on the outcomes of previous auditing processes. Consequently,
the insurer can derive the relative fraud amount α := θˆ/θ in case fraudulent behav-
ior occurs. Since the optimal auditing strategy also depends on the prevalent fraud
probability p, the insurance company has to estimate this value. It then chooses the
corresponding optimal audit probability which maximizes its NPV in response.
3.4.2 Policyholder perspective
The policyholder has no reliable information about the behavior of the insurance
company regarding the verification process. He can only make assumptions about
its auditing probability q . Based on this estimate, the policyholder decides upon his
optimal fraud strategy p which maximizes U(WA1 ).
3.5 Analytical results
In the course of this subsection, we present some analytical results for the presented
optimization problems. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
The following proposition characterizes optimal fraud and auditing strategies for
the policyholder and the insurance company respectively in a general setting. For
this purpose, we make two assumptions. First of all, the policyholder’s risk aversion
parameter a is supposed to be non-zero, i.e., a > 0. This means, his objective function
is actually given as an expected utility function, i.e., the variance of the difference
between indemnity payment R(θ, θˆ) and actual loss θ , denoted by Var(θ − R(θ, θˆ)),
has an impact on the final result. Furthermore, whenever the policyholder decides
to make a fraudulent claim, he reports θˆ = αθ for some given finite α ≥ 1 to the
insurance company. This setting implies that the amount of fraud is constant.
We will derive optimal fraud and auditing strategies, namely popt and qopt, for the
setting introduced above.
Proposition 1 Assume p, q to be in the agreement range, i.e., an insurance contract
exists. For a > 0, B = θ , θˆ = αθ with some given α ≥ 1, the respective optimal
strategies popt, qopt are given by:
(i) Insurance company perspective
Let some p be given. In order for the net present value NPV to be maximized,
choose
qopt =
{
as large as possible if p > p∗
as small as possible if p ≤ p∗ , (16)
where p∗ := k
αE(θ)
.
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(ii) Policyholder perspective
Let some q be given. In order for the final expected utility U(WA1 ) to be max-
imized, choose
popt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
as large as possible such that −E(θ)
ap(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) ≥ 1
as small as possible such that −E(θ)
ap(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) ≤ 0
. (17)
For the case 0 < −E(θ)
ap(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) < 1 no general statement can be made.
Proposition 1(i) looks at the optimization problem from the insurance company
perspective. It states the optimal auditing strategy with respect to a given fraud prob-
ability. The insurance company has two general strategies to chose from. It can either
decide to audit the incoming claims with the maximal probability possible, i.e., such
that the participation constraints of both policyholder and insurance company hold
true, or the auditing probability can be chosen as minimal as possible. This decision
depends on an estimate of the policyholder’s behavior p. Based on whether it exceeds
or deceeds the threshold k
αE(θ)
, the insurance company opts for a high or low auditing
probability respectively. According to Proposition 1(i), the exceed of the threshold is
influenced by the costs per audit k. The lower these are, given some fixed α and θ ,
the more likely it is for the fraud probability to exceed the resulting threshold. In this
case, it becomes optimal for the insurance company to verify the incoming claims
with a high probability. The opposite relationship holds true for the expected loss
amount θ and the degree of fraud which is represented by α. The higher their values
are, the lower the threshold becomes and the more likely it is for the estimated fraud
probability to exceed the latter. For the insurance company this implies auditing the
incoming claims with the highest probability possible as well. For an illustration of
the results obtained in Proposition 1(i) see Fig. 1a and the discussions in Sect. 5.1.
Proposition 1(ii) considers the policyholder point of view in this optimization
problem. In this case, the decision whether to chose the fraud probability as large
or small as possible given a certain auditing strategy, is not as clear as in the pre-
vious situation described in Proposition 1(i) especially since there are situations for
which no forecast can made. Furthermore, difficulties arise when trying to interpret
the impact of single model parameters on the value of the threshold which deter-
mines the optimal auditing behavior in the known cases. However, see Fig. 1b and
the discussions in Sect. 5.1 for an illustration of the optimal fraud probability from
the policyholder perspective.
The challenges which occur with finding a closed-form analytical solution to the
introduced maximization problem emphasize the need for a numerical approach. In
Sect. 4, we therefore present a method for deriving the agreement range for both
policyholder and insurance company. Furthermore, the impact of valid p − q combi-
nations on the objective quantities U(WA1 ) and NPV is analyzed and illustrated.
4 Computational aspects
As seen in the previous section, simple analytical solutions to the optimization prob-
lem can not be derived for all general settings. Moreover, the results may be hard to
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interpret both graphically and economically. In this section, we will approach these
challenges by using numerical methods and Monte Carlo simulation. The aim is to
compute the agreement range with respect to the fraud and auditing strategies for
various parameterizations of the model. After having introduced the procedure, the
results of the simulations will be analyzed and presented graphically.
4.1 Monte Carlo simulation and numerical methods
We use the Monte Carlo technique to find the optimal agreement range regarding the
fraud and auditing strategies of the policyholder and the insurance company respec-
tively. The main idea behind this approach is to generate a sufficiently large number
of realizations N of the random variable θ . Furthermore, we consider all fraud and
auditing probabilities p and q which are represented by l · 1
M
for l = 0,1, . . . ,M
where M denotes the number of discretization points on the interval [0,1]. Based
on these assumptions, the resulting indemnity payments R, the policyholder’s wealth
positions with and without having signed the insurance contract WA1 and W
B
1 as well
as the insurance company’s value V are calculated for each outcome of the simula-
tion and each fraud and auditing probability combination. Using (1), (6) and (8) for
R, WB1 and W
A
1 respectively, this can written as follows
R[n, i, j ] = (1 − p[i])θ [n] + p[i]((1 − q[j ])αθ + q[j ](θ [n] − B[n])) (18)
WB1 [n, i, j ] = W0 − θ [n] (19)
WA1 [n, i, j ] = W0 − Pθ [n] + R[n, i, j ], (20)
where θ [n] denotes the nth realization of the random variable θ and p[i] and q[j ]
are the considered fraud and auditing probability represented by i 1
M
and j 1
M
for
i, j = 0,1, . . . ,M respectively. Consequently, the term [n, i, j ] indicates for which
combination of loss realization and fraud and auditing probabilities the quantities R,
WB1 and W
A
1 are evaluated.
The next step to determining the agreement range is to derive the objective quanti-
ties, i.e., the policyholder’s final utility depending on whether he signed the insurance
contract prior to the loss or not and the insurance company’s present value based on
the corresponding wealth and value positions calculated before. For this purpose, we
use arithmetic averaging with respect to the realizations of the random variable θ for
each possible combination of p and q . Regarding the individual’s final utility when
having decided against insurance coverage, we use the following formula, derived
from (10)
U
(
WB1
)[i, j ] = μˆn
(
WB1 [n, i, j ]
) − a
2
σˆ 2n
(
WB1 [n, i, j ]
)
, (21)
where μˆn denotes the estimator for the expected value with respect to all realizations
n = 1, . . . ,N and σˆ 2n the estimator for the variance with respect to all realizations
n = 1, . . . ,N . The same procedure applies for the case when an insurance contract
was signed, this time using (11):
U
(
WA1
)[i, j ] = μˆn
(
WA1 [n, i, j ]
) − a
2
σˆ 2n
(
WA1 [n, i, j ]
)
. (22)
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From the insurance company point of view, the net present value of its future
incoming and outgoing cash flows depending on the fraud and auditing probability
can be derived as follows, based on (2)
NPV[i, j ] = P − μˆn
(
R[n, i, j ]) − q[j ]k. (23)
We are now in the position to check for the participation constraints of both policy-
holder and insurance company. Only if these hold true, an insurance contract comes
into existence and merely in this case, the optimization problems are well defined.
The idea here is to systematically analyze the participation constraints given in (12)
and (3) for each combination of fraud and auditing probabilities. In case these are
verified, we consider the corresponding p–q combination as valid. At the end of this
procedure, we obtain the agreement range.
The actual aim is to find the optimal strategies p and q such that the objective
quantities, i.e., the policyholder’s final wealth position U(WA1 ) and the present value
of the insurance company’s future incoming and outgoing cash flows NPV , are maxi-
mized from each of the participants perspectives. In order for these to be determined,
we calculate the results for U(WA1 ) and NPV evaluated with respect to the valid p–q
combinations respectively. Once the maximal values have been found, we can retrace
the corresponding fraud and auditing probabilities under which the maximum was
attained. This procedure is performed separately for the two participants.
4.2 Choice of parameters
We analyze the implementation of the model for different parameterizations. The aim
here is to study the influence of certain model parameters on the agreement range
regarding the valid fraud and auditing probabilities.
Table 1 sums up the choices for the input parameters for a reference setting. In the
course of this section, we base our simulations and studies on these values. A detailed
description of the assumptions leading to these choices can be found in Müller et al.
(2011).
Unless otherwise noted, the simulation results are based on N = 100,000 realiza-
tions of the loss variable θ and M = 50 discretization points in the interval [0,1].
Table 1 Input parameters for
the reference setting Input parameter Reference level
Initial wealth position W0 0
Insurance premium P 1.45
Occurred loss θ ln N (1,0.4)
Fraud amount α 1.2
Risk aversion parameter a 6
Auditing cost k 0.1
Penalty payment B Realization of θ
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5 Simulation results
This section summarizes the main findings of the working paper written by Müller
et al. (2011). The discussion of the results from the perspective of both stakeholders,
as well as further sensitivity analyses can be found in the working paper.
In this contribution, we present the agreement range resulting from the parametriza-
tion chosen in the reference setting. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis with regard to
the influence of the relative fraud amount is performed.
5.1 The reference setting
Figure 1 shows the agreement range from both the policyholder as well as the insur-
ance company perspective based on the values for the input parameters which were
presented above. Each point in the graphic represents a valid fraud and auditing prob-
ability combination.
In order to illustrate the dimension of the objective quantities U(WA1 ) and NPV
which result from the current parameter choice and a certain p–q combination, the
points are displayed in different colors according to the value. For this purpose, given
that the input parameters are fixed, the p–q combinations which lead to the low-
est third of outcomes are presented in the lightest color whereas those combinations
which result in the highest third of outcomes are shown in the darkest color. The re-
maining points are displayed in a medium color. This implies that the darker the color
of a point, the higher is the relative value of the corresponding U(WA1 ) or NPV .
5.2 Sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters
In the remainder of this section, we present and discuss the resulting agreement range,
i.e., all valid p − q combinations, based on different choices regarding the input
parameter fraud amount α.
Fig. 1 Agreement range from both stakeholders’ perspectives respectively. All parameters are chosen as
presented in Table 1. p–q combinations which result in the highest third of NPV and U(WA1 ) respectively
are displayed in the darkest color, the ones which result in the lowest third of NPV and U(WA1 ) respectively
in the lightest color and the remaining ones in a medium color
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Fig. 2 Agreement range for different fraud amounts α. The remaining parameters are chosen as presented
in Table 1
5.2.1 Influence of fraud amount
In Fig. 2 the agreement range is displayed for the fraud amounts α = 1.1 and α = 1.8
respectively, i.e., in case of fraudulent behavior the claimed loss is given by θˆ = 1.1 ·θ
or θˆ = 1.8 · θ . Again, the remaining input parameters are chosen as displayed in
Table 1.
Comparing the graphics for the different choices of α, we see that this time the
upper bound of the agreement range as well as part of the lower bound shift in an
upward direction when increasing the fraud amount. To be more precise: While the
number of valid p–q combinations with high auditing probabilities q increases for all
fraud strategies p, the change in the lower bound occurs only in the area of high fraud
probabilities p. Summing up these effects, we can say that the higher the amount
of fraud the broader the agreement range becomes. However, a change from α =
1.2 in the reference setting to α = 1.1 results in marginal modifications within the
agreement range.
This outcome can be interpreted the following way: The higher the amount of
fraud α per claim, the more likely it is for the policyholder to accept higher audit-
ing probabilities q given that the own fraud probability p is fixed. In these cases,
even though the auditing activity increased, the gain in final utility U(WA1 ) due to
excessive claiming is still positive despite the higher chance of being convicted and
imposed with a penalty payment. On the other hand, it becomes unattractive from the
insurance company perspective to audit the incoming claims with a low probability
q when the amount of fraud is increased assuming a high fixed fraud behavior p.
Such a strategy would imply that the majority of fraudulent claims remained unde-
tected which consequently leads to an increase in outgoing cash flows due to exces-
sive fraud amounts which is not covered by incoming positions like the insurance
premiums or penalty payments. Therefore, if the fraud amount α goes up, p–q com-
binations with higher values for q become acceptable to both stakeholders whereas
no insurance contract will come into existence with individuals who are expected to
commit excessive fraud frequently.
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6 Conclusive remarks
In this paper we build and analyze a model framework which depicts the handling of
insurance claims fraud based on a costly state verification approach. We present ana-
lytical solutions as well as numerical methods for solving the resulting optimization
problems which take both the insurance company and the policyholder perspective
into account. Our focus is set on deriving an agreement range consisting of all valid
fraud and auditing probability combinations. In addition, we discuss the impact of a
relevant input parameter on the size of the agreement range.
One of our main findings is the derivation of optimal auditing and fraud strategies
from stakeholders’ perspectives respectively. Especially from the insurance company
point of view, they seem intuitive: Summarizing, it can be said that the optimal an-
swer to low fraud probabilities is to perform auditing with a small probability as well
whereas medium and high fraud probabilities require the largest valid audit probabil-
ity in order to maximize the net present value. However when audits are performed
with a small constant probability, it is optimal to chose those policyholders whose
claims contain fraud with a low probability. If the insurance company commits itself
to a high audit probability, it is optimal to chose policyholders who report fraudulent
claims with a high probability.
Based on our numerical approach, we are able to present and analyze the agree-
ment range for different parameterizations as well as the optimality of different audit-
ing and fraud probability combinations regarding the stakeholders’ respective objec-
tive quantities. We find that a high relative amount of fraud results in broadening the
agreement range, the latter becomes smaller whenever the value of this particular in-
put parameter is chosen the opposite way. Furthermore, the simulation results support
and illustrate our analytical findings regarding optimal fraud and auditing strategies.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Using (1), (2) and the assumptions B = θ , θˆ = αθ with α ≥ 1, we get
NPV = P − (1 − p)E(θ) − p[(1 − q)E(θˆ ) + qE(θ − B)] − qk
= P − (1 − p)E(θ) − p(1 − q)αE(θ) − qk
= P − E(θ) + p(1 − α)E(θ) + q[αpE(θ) − k]. (24)
Deriving (24) with respect to q leads to
∂
∂q
NPV = αpE(θ) − k, (25)
which can be distinguished into two cases with respect to its sign.
(a) If for the given fraud strategy p > k
αE(θ)
holds, the NPV as defined in (2)
has a positive slope with respect to the parameter q . Consequently, the op-
timal auditing strategy qopt has to be chosen as large as possible in order to
maximize the value of NPV .
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(b) If the given fraud strategy p is given such that p ≤ k
αE(θ)
holds, the NPV
has a negative slope with respect to the parameter q . Hence, the optimal
auditing strategy qopt has to be chosen as small as possible for the NPV to
be maximized.
(ii) Applying the assumptions a = 0, B = θ , θˆ = αθ with α ≥ 1 to (1) and (11), we
obtain
U
(
WA1
) = W0 − P − E(θ) + (1 − p)E(θ) + p
[
(1 − q)E(θˆ) + qE(θ − B)]
− a
2
Var
[−θ + (1 − p)θ + p(1 − q)θˆ + pq(θ − B)]
= W0 − P − E(θ) + (1 − p)E(θ) + p(1 − q)E(θˆ)
− a
2
Var
[−θ + (1 − p)θ + p(1 − q)θˆ]
= W0 − P − pE(θ) + pαE(θ) − pqαE(θ)
− a
2
Var(−pθ + pαθ − pqαθ)
= W0 − P − p(1 − α + qα)E(θ) − a2p
2(1 − α + qα)2 Var(θ). (26)
Deriving (26) with respect to p results in
∂
∂p
U
(
WA1
) = −(1 − α + qα)E(θ) − ap(1 − α + qα)2 Var(θ). (27)
Based on (27), three cases can be identified:
(a) For −E(θ)
ap(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) ≥ 1, the policyholder can choose any fraud strat-
egy p ∈ [0,1], especially any p in the agreement range, such that p ≤
−E(θ)
a(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) . Applying this inequality to (27), we obtain ∂∂pU(WA1 ) ≥ 0.
From this can be concluded that U(WA1 ) has a positive slope. Consequently,
the optimal fraud strategy popt has to be chosen as large as possible in order
to maximize the value of U(WA1 ).
(b) Similarly, for −E(θ)
ap(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) ≤ 0, the policyholder can choose any fraud
strategy p ∈ [0,1], especially any p in the agreement range, such that p ≥
−E(θ)
a(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) . For (27) this implies that ∂∂pU(WA1 ) ≤ 0. This means that
in this case U(WA1 ) has a negative slope and hence, the optimal fraud strategy
popt needs to be chosen as small as possible for U(WA1 ) to be maximized.
(c) For 0 < −E(θ)
a(1−α(1−q))Var(θ) < 1, no general statement about the corresponding
optimal fraud strategy popt can be made. 
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